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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
become more and more limited so that prescription now does
run against these persons in several situations. Article 3541 in
the part on liberative prescription was amended by Act 736 of
1954 so as to make the thirty-year (liberative) prescriptions run
against these persons.81 Act 341 of 1958 further amended this
same article so as to make this provision cover both liberative
and acquisitive thirty-year prescriptions. Prior amendments con-
cerning the running of the ten-year acquisitive prescription
against minors, interdicts, married women, and absentees, were
duly incorporated in the appropriate article.82 The 1958 amend-
ment concerning acquisitive prescription would have had a
proper location in Article 3499.
An important immediate and transitional feature of this
1958 act is not in the express article amendment but in another
section of the statute. This provides that the amended article
"shall operate retrospectively, as well as prospectively"; how-
ever, there is the proviso that no prescription of thirty years
shall accrue before the expiration of 6 months from the effective
date of the act.88
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APPELLATE REVISION
The most acute problem which has confronted the legal pro-
fession in Louisiana during the past few years has been the over-
load thrown upon our Supreme Court by its ever-increasing civil
appellate docket. To solve this problem the Judicial Council,
through a committee of its own, and in cooperation with the
Chief Justice, the judges of all of the appellate courts, the Ju-
dicial Administrator, and committees of the state and local bar
31. Hebert & Lazarus, 1954 Legislation Affecting the Civil Code, 15 LOUISIANA
LAW REvIEw 9, 16-18 (1954), considered the 1954 act as covering both liberative
and acquisitive prescription. Their comments are predicated upon Louisiana de-
cisions there cited which fuse Articles 3499 (acquisitive prescription) and 3548
(liberative prescription) as one, upon the assumption that the only thirty-year
prescription involves title to immovable property. However, there are also other
actions subject to the thirty-year liberative prescription in LA. CIVIL CODE arts.
68, 78, 1030 (1870), and LA. R.S. 9:5701 (1950), which deny the generalization
that Article 3548 is the counterpart or affirmance of Article 3499.
32. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 3478 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1920, No. 161,
and La. Acts 1924, No. 64.
33. La. Acts 1958, No. 341, § 2.
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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associations, has labored for the past two years. The recom-
mendation of the Judicial Council for a constitutional amend-
ment to make the necessary revision of our appellate court sys-
tem, to become effective on July 1, 1960, was considered by the
Legislature during the last session.' Favorable action thereon
was taken through the adoption of a joint resolution submitting
a proposed amendment of Article VII of the Constitution. The
proposed constitutional amendment submitted by this joint reso-
lution seeks to carry into effect the recommendations of the Ju-
dicial Council to restrict severely the civil appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, to increase materially the jurisdiction of
the courts of appeal, to create an additional court of appeal, and
to increase the number of judges on all of these intermediate ap-
pellate courts. The proposed constitutional amendment submit-
ted by this resolution, however, goes beyond the recommenda-
tions of the Judicial Council in further increasing the number
of additional judges of the courts of appeal.
Since, at this writing, the constitutional amendment proposed
by this joint resolution has to be submitted to the qualified
electors of the state for ratification, no detailed consideration of
the appellate revision to be effected thereby will be attempted
here, but will be the subject of an article to be published in a
subsequent issue of the Review.
JUDICIAL NOTICE OF ORDINANCES
In common with all other American jurisdictions, Louisiana
follows the rule that in the absence of statute a court of general
jurisdiction cannot take judicial cognizance of an ordinance of a
city, or other local governmental unit.2 Similarly, the universal
rule that a city court may take judicial cognizance of an ordi-
nance of its own city is likewise recognized in this state.8 Louisi-
ana, however, applies the unique rule that on appeal of a case
tried in a city court which took judicial notice of a city ordinance
the appellate court cannot similarly take judicial cognizance of
1. La. Acts 1958, No. 561.
2. Doll v. Flintkote Co., 231 La. 241, 91 So.2d 24 (1956) ; State ex rel. Hour-
guettes v. City of Gretna, 194 La. 460, 193 So. 706 (1940) ; Valenti v. Oster Bros.
Carriage & Wagon Mfg. Co., 154 La. 991, 98 So. 553 (1923) ; City of New Or-
leans v. Calamari, 150 La. 737, 91 So. 172, 22 A.L.R. 106 (1922) ; Stevens v.
Delanoix, 96 So.2d 844 (La. App. 1957).
3. New Orleans v. Mangiarisian, 139 La. 605, 71 So. 886 (1916) ; State ex rel.
Cotonio v. Judge of Criminal District Court, 105 La. 758, 80 So. 105 (1900);
Brandt v. New Orleans Public Service, 15 La. App. 391, 132 So. 244 (1931). See
also cases cited infra note 4.
1958]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
the ordinance.4 Hence, in this state, it is not only necessary to
plead and prove a city ordinance in cases tried in a district court;
but as a practical matter, whenever the case is appealable, it is at
least necessary to introduce a copy of the city ordinance in evi-
dence in a case tried in a city court.
A statute adopted during the past session will make the plead-
ing and proof of municipal ordinances unnecessary in many in-
stances. 5 This act requires all courts of record 6 to take judicial
cognizance of all municipal and parochial ordinances enacted by
municipalities and parishes within their respective jurisdictions
when certified copies thereof have been filed with their clerks of
court. The statute further provides that a certified copy of any
such ordinance may be filed with the clerk of the court either by
the custodian of the ordinance or by "any lawful officer of the
court" - a phrase broad enough to include every attorney en-
titled to practice before the court in which the ordinance is to be
filed.
The peculiar Louisiana rule mentioned above, however, will
require dual filings of certified copies of each ordinance - one
with the clerk of the trial court, and the other with the clerk of
the appellate court. The result will be to limit the usefulness of
the statute to those ordinances which the attorney expects to rely
on in more than one case, such as municipal traffic ordinances.
In those instances where the attorney expects to use the ordi-
nance only once, he will find it simpler to plead and prove it,
offering one certified copy thereof in evidence, than to file two
certified copies, one with the clerk of the trial court and the
other with the clerk of the appellate court.
NONRESIDENT MOTORIST STATUTE
The Nonresident Motorist Statute7 provides that the opera-
tion of a motor vehicle on the public highways of the state by a
nonresident is equivalent to his appointment of the Secretary of
State as agent for the service of process in any action brought
4. Horn v. Draube, 16 La. App. 17, 132 So. 531 (1931) ; Di Leo v. Du Montier,
195 So. 74 (La. App. 1940) ; Pacific Fire Ins. Co. v. Employers Liability A. Corp.,
34 So.2d 796 (La. App. 1948); Myers v. Landry, 50 So.2d 318 (La. App. 1951)
Hardware Mut. Cas. Co. v. Abadie, 51 So.2d 664 (La. App. 1951).
5. La. Acts 1958, No. 316, § 1, amending and re-enacting LA. R.S. 13:3712
(1950).
6. The statute might have been somewhat clearer had the draftsman used the
language "all district and appellate courts," but the phrase "courts of record" in-
cludes all such courts in Louisiana. See 10 WORDS & PHRASES 266 (Perm. ed.).
7. LA. R.S. 13:3474 and 13:3475 (1950).
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against him in a court in this state to recover damages for the
negligent operation of the motor vehicle. Early in 1956, it had
been held that such an appointment terminated with the death of
the nonresident, and that in an action brought against his per-
sonal representative process could not be served on the Secretary
of State." As a result of this decision, the utility of the statute
was impaired in cases where the nonresident died as the result
of the vehicular accident, and his casualty insurer was not li-
censed to do business in Louisiana.
The Legislature acted quickly to broaden the statute so as to
fill in the hiatus thus disclosed. The act was amended 9 to provide
that such use of a motor vehicle is equivalent to an appointment
of the Secretary of State as agent for the service of process. in
such actions brought not only against the nonresident, but
brought against: (1) his casualty insurer, if not licensed to do
business in this state; (2) his personal representative, in the
event of the death of the nonresident; and (3) his heirs or lega-
tees, in the event of the death of the nonresident and failure to
appoint a personal representative.
The statutory appointment of the Secretary of State as the
agent for the service of process for the casualty insurer of the
nonresident was upheld as constitutional recently by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. 10
The statutory appointment of the Secretary of State as the agent
for the service of process for the personal representative of the
deceased nonresident has not as yet been questioned judicially,
but the great probabilities are that if challenged it will be held
constitutional. With but one exception," similar legislation of
other states has been held constitutional. 12 The statutory ap-
pointment of the Secretary of State as the agent for the service
of process on the heirs or legatees of a deceased nonresident is
both unnecessary and unworkable.'
3
8. Fazio v. American Auto Ins. Co., 136 F. Supp. 184 (D.C. La. 1956).
9. By La. Acts 1956, No. 138, § 1.
10. Pugh v. Oklahoma Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 159 F. Supp. 155
(D.C. La. 1958).
11. Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (D.C. Iowa 1947), holding the Iowa
statute unconstitutional.
12. Oviatt v. Garrettson, 205 Ark. 792, 171 S.W.2d 287 (1943) (Arkansas
statute) ; Plopa v. DuPre, 327 Mich. 660, 42 N.W.2d 777 (1950) (Michigan stat-
ute) ; Leighton v. Roper, 300 N.Y. 434, 91 N.E.2d 876, 18 A.L.R.2d 537 (1950)
(New York statute) ; and Feinsinger v. Bard, 195 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1952) (Wis-
consin statute).
13. The draftsman of the amendment overlooked the fact that Louisiana is the
only state in the Union in which the doctrine of universal succession is recognized.
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During the past session, the Nonresident Motorist Statute
was again amended. 14 This time, however, the legislative change
was slight. Heretofore, the act has provided that the operation
of a motor vehicle on the public highways of the state by a non-
resident, or his authorized agent or employee, is deemed equiva-
lent to the appointment of the Secretary of State as agent for the
service of process. The 1958 amendment broadens the statute
slightly to provide that such operation by a nonresident, his au-
thorized agent, employee, "or person for whom he is legally
responsible" is deemed equivalent to such appointment. This
slight addition presents none of the serious and interesting prob-
lems which the 1956 amendment presented.
Lis PENDENS STATUTE
R.S. 13:3541 provides that the pendency of an action affect-
ing the title to, or asserting a mortgage or lien on, immovable
property does not constitute notice to third persons unless notice
of the pendency thereof has been filed in the mortgage office of
the parish. Although it may sometimes be just as necessary for
the defendant as for the plaintiff to obtain the protection of this
constructive notice to third persons, heretofore the statute has
been so narrowly phrased that the statutory remedy was avail-
able only to a plaintiff.15 In the past session, this unfortunate
hiatus was corrected by an amendment of the Lis Pendens Stat-
ute.16 It is now possible for the defendant, or for any other party,
to the action or proceeding to file notice of the pendency thereof,
so as to afford constructive notice to third persons. This amend-
ment rounds out the statute by providing that if judgment is
rendered against the party who caused the notice of the pendency
of the action to be recorded, the judgment may order the cancel-
lation of such notice at the expense of the party who had it re-
corded originally.
This amendment increases appreciably the utility of a very
useful remedy.
NONRESIDENT WITNESSES WITHIN ONE HUNDRED MILES
R.S. 13:3661 regulates the summoning of witnesses who are
nonresidents of the parish in which the case is to be tried, but
In all other states, the liability would be one of the personal representative of the
decreased, to be paid in due course of the administration of the estate.
14. La. Acts 1958, No. 345, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 13:3474 (1950).
15. Hecker v. Bourdette, 9 Orl. App. 121 (La. App. 1912).




who live within one hundred miles of the place where the court is
to be held. Two statutes adopted during the past session amend-
ed this provision.17 Both amendments left the mileage to be paid
such witnesses at an inadequate five cents a mile, but raised the
per diem witness fee from a dollar and a half to five dollars. One
of the amendatory acts, however, leaves the hotel and meal allow-
ance, in the event the witness is required to remain for more
than one day, at the totally inadequate figure of three dollars
and fifty cents a day. The other more generously increases this
allowance to five dollars a day. The two amendments may be
reconciled readily by accepting the higher allowance.
PHOTOGRAPHIC REPRODUCTION OF RECORDS
R.S. 13:914 required the clerk of each district court to record
in a bound book all pleadings, original documents, and judg-
ments; and provided that if the original record is lost or de-
stroyed a certified copy from this bound record may be substi-
tuted therefor.
Considering the manner in which original records are made
available for use by attorneys and members of the public in the
majority of district courts, this statutory provision is a wise pre-
caution which makes accurate copies available in the event of the
loss or destruction of the original. However, it imposed a heavy
burden of expense upon busy clerks' offices, where the necessity
of typing every pleading, exhibit, and judgment made it neces-
sary to employ additional typists solely for this purpose. During
the past session, these clerks were granted relief from this heavy
burden by an amendment of the statute. 8 As amended, the act
now requires clerks to record these pleadings, documents, and
judgments in a bound volume either by copying, or by photo-
recording, photo-copying, micro-filming, or other photographic
method of reproduction. This amendment retains the require-
ment that accurate copies of all judicial records be retained, but
makes it possible for the clerks to reduce the expense thereof
appreciably.
FUND CONTINUOUSLY ACCRUING IN CONCURSUS PROCEEDING
A stakeholder who has in his possession funds claimed ad-
versely by two or more claimants may deposit the funds into the
17. La. Acts 1958, No. 303, § 1, and No. 527, § 1.
18. La. Acts 1958, No. 319, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 18:914 (1950).
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registry of a court of competent jurisdiction, and in a concursus
proceeding implead the adverse claimants to assert their re-
spective claims to the fund deposited. 19 If the fund is one which
continues to accrue, the stakeholder may deposit it in the registry
of the court from time to time as it accrues.20 The statutory pro-
vision regulating these recurring deposits, however, has been
anything but specific. Since the original deposit had to be made
either by cash or by certified check, the recurring deposit sim-
ilarly had to be so made. But aside from providing that the
claimants need not be cited again each time such a recurring
deposit is made, the pertinent statutory provision was silent on
the procedure to be followed.
This statutory provision was amended during the past legisla-
tive session.2 1 A new paragraph was added to the existing sec-
tion, reading as follows:
"Such supplemental deposits may be made in the same
manner as the initial deposits; except that, when such de-
posits are made by check, the checks therefor need not be
certified. Such checks, however, must contain thereon, or on
vouchers attached thereto, the docket number of the con-
cursus proceeding and sufficient information to enable the
clerk of court to identify the deposit as such. No other for-
mality in making or transmitting the deposit shall be re-
quired."
This amendment simplifies the procedure for making these
recurring deposits. Because of the manner in which the amend-
ment was made, however, the validity thereof is not entirely free
from doubt.22
MISCELLANEOUS AMENDMENTS
The majority of the statutes in this area adopted during the
last session of the Legislature possess local or limited importance
19. LA. R.S. 13:4811 through 13:4817 (1950).
20. LA. R.S. 13:4817 (1950).
21. La. Acts 1958, No. 325, § 1, amending LA. R.S. 13:4817 (1950).
22. The amending statute merely added the quoted paragraph to the single
paragraph of the amended section, without complying with the requirement of Art.
III, § 16, of the Constitution that the section amended "shall be re-enacted and
published at length." There is some question presented as to whether this form
of amendment is valid. Cf. New Orleans v. Board of Supervisors of Elections for
Parish of Orleans, 216 La. 116, 142, 143, 43 So.2d 237, 246 (1948); and see




only, and since they are not of general interest to members of the
profession, no attempt will be made to review them here. In-
cluded in this category are the statutes creating additional judge-
ships, increasing the salaries of judges and other officers of vari-
ous courts, increasing the schedule of fees in certain courts, and
creating additional city courts throughout the state.
Criminal Law and Procedure
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CRIMINAL LAW
The offense of criminal mischief' is extended by Act 174 to
embrace another form of interference with law enforcement.
Under added clause (5), the giving of false reports or complaints
of crimes is an offense. Since criminal mischief requires a gen-
eral criminal intent,2 the false report must be known to be false.
The penalty for armed robbery3 is increased by Act 380 from
imprisonment for from one to fifteen years to imprisonment for
from two to thirty years. The increased maximum is in accord
with the maximum penalty of thirty years for the comparably
dangerous crime of aggravated burglary,4 but the minimum of
two years appears a little stiff. Of course the trial judge may
always place the lesser participant, who is a first offender, on
probation.
Act 315 supplements the unlawful sales to minors article of
the Criminal Code' by setting up three special offenses where
alcoholic beverages are sold to or for those under 18 years of age.
All of the provisons avoid the possible limitations of the phrase
"intoxicating and spirituous liquors" to distilled beverages, as
distinguished from beer and wine. They refer to "alcoholic bev-
erages of either high or low alcoholic content." Under Section 1
the purchaser who is "over the age of 17 and under the age of
18" is subject to a light penalty of not over a $25.00 fine or not
more than 10 days imprisonment. Under Section 2 the purchase
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. R.S. 14:59 (1950).
2. Articles 59 defines criminal mischief as "the intentional performance of any
of the following acts."
3. LA. R.S. 14:64 (1950).
4. Id. 14:60.
5. Id. 14:91.
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